


















not	 adequately	 respond	 to	 the	 kinds	 of	 organisational	 failings	 identified	 by	 the	 Royal	
Commission.	I	argue	in	favour	of	developing	a	new	institutional	offence	constructed	upon	
realist	concepts	of	negligence	and/or	corporate	culture	that	recognises	that	organisations	
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social	 and	moral	 condemnation	of	 organisations	 and	 the	 legal	 position	 of	 these	 organisations	
(Colvin	1995).	A	key	obstacle	militating	against	 criminalising	organisations	 is	 the	difficulty	of	
conceptualising	organisational	fault	due	to	the	dominance	of	individualistic	subjective	culpability	
in	 criminal	 legal	 attributions	of	blameworthiness.	This	 article	explores	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	
criminal	 legal	 system’s	 emphasis	 upon	 individualistic	 subjective	 fault	 is	 inadequate	 in	 its	
response	to	organisational	 failures	and	explores	 the	ways	 in	which	organisations	should	have	





and	 has	 been	 extended	 to	 continue	 until	 the	 end	 of	 2017.2	 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	 Royal	
Commission	 had	 completed	 its	 last	 of	 57	 public	 hearings,	 and	 held	more	 than	 6,600	 private	




and	 the	 findings	 are	 then	 presented	 in	 Reports.	 The	 Royal	 Commission	 has	 considered	 child	
sexual	 abuse	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 institutions	 including	 schools,	 after‐school	 care,	 religious	




of	a	 series	of	public	 inquiries	 that	have	occurred	 internationally	 into	 institutional	 child	abuse	
(Daly	 2014;	 Swain	 2014).3	 The	 Royal	 Commission,	 like	 the	 other	 public	 inquiries,	 offers	 an	
opportunity	for	legislators	to	address	the	unsatisfactory	criminal	justice	response	to	institutional	
child	sexual	abuse.	This	potential	can	be	situated	as	part	of	the	criminal	legal	system’s	response	
(or	 lack	 thereof)	 to	organisational	or	corporate	malfeasance.	Reforms	 in	 relation	 to	corporate	
crime	have	often	been	motivated	by	particular	events.	For	example,	the	corporate	manslaughter	
reforms	in	the	United	Kingdom	were	motivated	by	unsuccessful	prosecutions	in	response	to	the	




Corporate	 criminal	 responsibility	 ‘is	 often	 tolerated	 rather	 than	 encouraged’	 (Wells	 2014).	
Corporate	criminal	law	has	emerged	on	a	case–by‐case	and,	more	recently,	a	statute‐by‐statute	
basis	with	a	consequent	 lack	of	general	principles	(with	a	notable	exception	of	 the	Australian	
Model	 Criminal	 Code—Criminal	Code	Act	1995	 (Cth)—discussed	 below).	 There	 is	 a	wealth	 of	
excellent	literature	about	the	difficulties	the	criminal	legal	system	has	in	grappling	with	corporate	
responsibility	 (Fisse	 and	 Braithwaite	 1993;	 Gilchrist	 2012‐2013;	 Gunningham	 1987;	 Wells,	
2014).	 In	 particular,	 the	 general	 principles	 of	 criminal	 law	were	 constructed	 based	 primarily	
upon	 individual	 responsibility,	 and	 this	 has	 meant	 that	 the	 criminal	 legal	 system	 has	 had	
difficulties	in	responding	to	the	developing	dominance	of	business	corporations	(Wells	2014).	A	




involved	 are	not	 regarded	 as	 corporations	 at	 law	 and	 thus	 evade	 corporate	 liability	 (Gleeson	
2016).	The	Royal	Commission	has	adopted	a	realist	perspective	with	regard	to	institutions	that	
are	 the	subject	of	 the	 inquiry,	 focusing	on	 institutions	and	 their	 failure	 to	protect	against	and	
respond	to	child	sexual	abuse	rather	than	definitions	at	corporate	law	which	are	designed,	and	
have	 been	 used,	 to	 protect	 against	 institutional	 liability	 (Doyle	 and	Rubino	 2003‐2004).	 This	
article	 reflects	 a	 similar	 approach.	 Whilst	 the	 bulk	 of	 academic	 research	 into	 organisational	








recent	proposals	by	 the	Royal	Commission	 for	 criminal	 law	reform	 in	 the	Consultation	Paper:	
Criminal	Justice	(the	 ‘Consultation	Paper’)	(Royal	Commission	2016a).	The	central	focus	of	the	
Royal	 Commission	 is	 in	 its	 title:	 ‘…	 Institutional	 [emphasis	 added]	 Responses	 to	 Child	 Sexual	
Abuse’.	This	is	also	emphasised	by	the	Letters	Patent	which	require	the	Commission	to	consider	
the	 role	 of	 institutions	 where	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 has	 occurred	 and	 their	 activities	 that	 have	
‘created,	facilitated,	increased,	or	in	any	way	contributed	to,	(whether	by	act	or	omission)	the	risk	
of	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 or	 the	 circumstances	 or	 conditions	 giving	 rise	 to	 that	 risk’	 (	 Royal	
Commission	2014b:	m(iv)).	However,	the	Consultation	Paper	suggests	that,	despite	the	details	in	
the	Royal	Commission	case	studies	(numbering	57	at	time	of	writing	and	henceforth	referred	to	





Consultation	Paper,	only	 ten	pages,	or	part	of	one	of	 the	15	chapters,	are	 focused	on	criminal	
justice	 responses	 to	 institutional	 failings.	 The	 bulk	 of	 analysis	 regarding	 organisational	
wrongdoing	 is	 actually	 in	 a	 separate	 report,	Sentencing	 for	Child	Sexual	Abuse	 in	 Institutional	
Contexts	(the	‘Sentencing	Report’)	(Freiberg	et	al.	2015).	Arguably,	the	capacity	for	the	authors	to	
focus	 on	 criminalising	 organisational	 wrongdoing	 was	 beyond	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 brief	 of	 the	
Sentencing	Report	as	no	organisations	have	been	punished	for	collective	wrongdoing.	However,	
the	authors	justified	their	approach	in	a	chapter	titled	‘Institutional	Offending:	The	Limits	of	the	
Law’:	 ‘the	 power	 to	 sentence	 is	 contingent	 upon	 the	 conviction,	 or	 finding	 of	 guilt,	 of	 the	
perpetrator.	 Sentencing	of	offenders	 for	 child	sexual	abuse	 focuses	on	 individuals	 rather	 than	
institutions	 or	 organisations’	 (Freiberg	 et	 al.	 2015).	 Freiberg	 et	 al.	 go	 on	 to	 consider	 how	









Commission.	 The	 evidence	 and	 findings	 of	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 demonstrate	 that	 an	
























in	 the	 Royal	 Commission.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 argue	 in	 favour	 of	 developing	 a	 new	
institutional	 offence	constructed	upon	 the	concepts	of	negligence	and/or	corporate	 culture	 in	
accordance	with	a	realist	approach	that	recognises	that	organisations	are	capable	of	wrongdoing.	





within	 institutions	 who	 did	 not	 actually	 perpetrate	 a	 crime	 but	 could	 be	 described	 as	 ‘third	
parties’	responsible	for	the	care	of	victims	and/or	perpetrators.	The	individualistic	focus	of	the	
Consultation	 Paper	 reflects	 general	 principles	 of	 criminal	 law	 that	 have	 been	 developed	 and	
articulated	primarily	around	individual	responsibility.	There	are	exceptions,	such	as	the	doctrine	
of	 complicity	 and	 conspiracy,	 but	 this	 ‘group	 dimension’	 is	 characterised	 and	 regarded	 as	
exceptional.	 The	 individualistic	 focus	 of	 criminal	 law	 has	 been	 retained	 in	 the	 regulation	 of	






or	 intention	or	be	negligent	and	he	has	 the	hands	 to	carry	out	his	 intentions.	A	





This	 reflects	 the	 contemporary	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 necessity	 of	 subjective	 culpability	 for	
attributions	of	blameworthiness	(Crofts	2013;	Fletcher	1978).	A	classic	response	to	this	has	been	
to	 create	 strict	 and	 absolute	 liability	 schemes	 that	 focus	 upon	 prohibited	 actions	 and/or	 the	
harms	 caused	 by	 organisations	 irrespective	 of	mens	 rea.	 Such	 regulatory	 schemes	 have	 been	











these	 systemic	 or	 cultural	 problems	 underpin	 harms.	 A	 second	 classic	 argument	 against	 the	
criminalisation	 of	 organisations	 was	 that	 traditional	 methods	 of	 punishment,	 in	 particular	
imprisonment,	could	not	be	applied	to	corporations	as	these	methods	were	constructed	around	
individuals	 rather	 than	 organisations	 (Coffee	 1981;	 Colvin	 1995).	 The	 issue	 of	 sanctions	 in	
response	 to	 organisational	malfeasance	 remains	 challenging	but	 jurisdictions	 have	developed	
innovative	sanctions	that	have	included	fines,	remedial	orders,	orders	for	the	advertisement	of	
convictions,	fines	and	the	nature	of	offences,	and	suspended	prosecutions	(Clough	and	Mulhern	
2002).	 These	 traditional	 arguments	 reflect	 and	 inform	 doubts	 as	 to	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	
appropriate	to	attribute	criminal	liability	to	organisations	that	cause	harm	but	are	not	without	
their	own	 internal	 shortcomings.	The	challenge	 remains	 to	 forge	a	 coherent	 link	between	 the	




is	worthy	 of	 criminal	 sanction.	 Individual	 subjective	 culpability	 has	 framed	 the	way	 in	which	
corporate	 offences	 have	 been	 structured.	 Historic	 approaches	 for	 attributing	 blame	 to	
corporations	were	based	on	the	assumption	that	corporate	wrongdoing	could	only	be	derivative	
of	 individual	 wrongdoing.	 The	 agency	 or	 vicarious	 principle	 held	 a	 company	 liable	 for	 the	














and	 to	 develop	 and	 enforce	 appropriate	 child	 safety	 policies.	 The	 higher	 up	 in	 the	 corporate	
hierarchy,	the	less	likely	was	a	person	to	know	of	(suspected)	grooming	or	child	sex	offending.	
The	 reporting	 procedures	 at	 the	 school	 in	Report	No.	 12	militated	 against	 upper	 and	middle	
management	being	aware	of	suspicions	about	 the	offending	 teacher.	The	school	operated	 two	
separate	personnel	file	systems	—one	at	the	preparatory	school	and	the	central	file	at	the	high	
school	more	than	a	kilometre	away—and	neither	file	system	required	a	reference	to	the	other.	













views	 corporations	 as	 nothing	 more	 than	 a	 collectivity	 of	 individuals;	 that	 is,	 the	 idea	 that	
corporations	can	only	act	through	individuals.	On	this	account,	the	corporation	is	simply	a	name	






corporations	 have	 an	 existence	 that	 is,	 to	 some	 extent,	 independent	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 their	
members	(Belcher	2006).	Corporations	can	act	and	be	at	fault	in	ways	that	are	different	from	the	
ways	 in	which	 their	members	 can	 act	 and	 be	 at	 fault	 (Colvin	 1995).	 The	 details	 of	 the	Royal	













around	 the	 failure	 to	 report	 and	 require	 some	 form	 of	 subjective	 culpability.	 All	 Australian	









belief	 that	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 is	 occurring	 or	 has	 occurred,	 and	 the	 reason	 for	 this	 lack	 of	
knowledge	is	itself	systemic.		
	

























child	 abuse	 and	 actively	 intervene	 to	 protect	 the	 perpetrator	 and/or	 did	 nothing.	 There	 has,	
however,	been	reluctance	to	investigate,	charge	or	prosecute	(Gleeson	2016).	Prosecutions	for	
failure	to	report	under	mandatory	reporting	duties	are	very	rare,	partly	because	of	an	emphasis	
upon	 encouraging	 reporting	 rather	 than	 policing	 it.	 Mathews	 (2014)	 has	 identified	 only	 six	
prosecutions	in	the	five	jurisdictions	across	Australia	with	a	mandatory	reporting	regime.		
	
Mandatory	 reporting	 offences	 reflect	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system’s	 focus	 on	 the	 individual	 in	

































significance	 to	 the	 reports	of	 inappropriate	behaviour	was	due	 to	an	organisational	 failure	 to	
adequately	train	staff	to	recognise	and	appropriately	report	grooming	behaviours.	The	absence	




The	 traditional	 focus	 on	 subjective	 culpability	 demonstrated	 in	 traditional	 constructions	 of	
corporate	liability	and	mandatory	reporting	offences	is	an	inadequate	response	to	institutional	
failure	 to	protect	 against	 child	sexual	abuse.	 It	 is	necessary	 to	construct	a	 realist	 approach	 to	
organisational	 failure.	 However,	 obstacles	 confronting	 a	 realist	 approach	 to	 organisational	
culpability	 are	 myriad	 although	 two	 dominant	 streams	 can	 be	 broadly	 summarised	 as	 the	





of	 why	 organisations	 should	 be	 criminalised	 at	 all;	 or	 whether,	 alternatively,	 organisational	
failure	should	be	best	left	to	the	civil	sphere.	These	two	challenges	are	frequently	referred	to	in	
tandem	and	yet	they	are	incompatible:	the	first	expresses	concern	about	issues	of	proof	and	the	



















(a) the	 organisation,	 or	 a	 high	 managerial	 agent	 of	 the	 organisation,	
recklessly	authorised	or	permitted	the	commission	of	that	offence	by	that	
person.	




















maintain	a	 ‘corporate	culture’	 that	would	not	tolerate	or	would	 lead	to	the	commission	of	 the	
child	sexual	assault.	Corporate	culture	is	defined	in	the	Commonwealth	Criminal	Code	Act	1995	
Part	 2.5	 as	 ‘an	 attitude,	 policy,	 rule,	 course	 of	 conduct	 or	 practice	 existing	 within	 the	 body	
corporate	generally	or	 in	the	part	of	 the	body	corporate	 in	which	 the	relevant	activities	 takes	
place’.	The	underlying	idea	of	‘corporate	culture’	is	to	cover	situations	where	there	is	a	difference	













(Beaton‐Wells	 and	 Fisse	 2011).	 Questions	 have	 been	 raised	 about	whose	actions	 or	 inactions	
should	 be	 included	 in	 considering	 institutional	 responsibility	 (Royal	 Commission	 2016a).	
Concern	has	also	been	expressed	that	an	institution’s	culture	may	have	changed	over	time,	by	
which	time	the	circumstances	and	management	that	allowed	the	abuse	to	occur	may	have	long	
since	 changed.	 It	 is	 argued	 that,	 in	 those	 circumstances,	 criminal	 sanctions	 directed	 at	
organisational	change	would	be	neither	helpful	nor	necessary	(Weissmann	and	Newman	2007).	







of	 child	sexual	assault.	Both	negligence	and	corporate	 culture	are	built	around	 the	concept	of	




whilst	 the	 criminal	 legal	 system	 is	 reluctant	 to	 impose	 fault	 for	 omissions,	 an	 accused	 can,	
nevertheless,	be	held	liable	for	omissions	for	the	bulk	of	criminal	offences	once	a	legal	duty	has	
been	established	(Ashworth	2013).	All	 the	 institutions	considered	 in	case	studies	 in	 the	Royal	
Commission	had	legal	duties	to	protect	the	children	in	their	care,	and	the	bulk	of	them	failed	long‐
term	 to	 fulfil	 these	 duties.	 Not	 only	 does	 criminal	 law	 have	 a	 long‐held	 tradition	 of	 holding	




Underlying	opposition	to	corporate	 liability	 is	 fostered	by	a	 failure	to	comprehend	the	idea	of	










over	 long	 periods	 of	 time	 due	 to	 a	 poor	 corporate	 culture.	 A	 similar	 argument	was	made	 by	
















the	 absence	 of	 training	 and	policies	 to	 prevent	molestation.	 This	 produces	 a	wholly	 different	
blame	 focus,	 which	 is	 increasingly	 recognised	 in	 academic	 literature,	 that	 the	 corporation	 is	
criminogenic:	 that	 is,	 corporations	 by	 their	 nature	 and	 culture	 can	 produce	 crime	 (Apel	 and	























 Situations	 present	 behavioural	 cues,	 social	 pressures	 and	 environmental	
stressors	that	trigger	a	criminal	response.	For	example,	a	sense	of	emotional	
congruence	with	a	child	might	turn	into	a	sexual	incident.	









Attributing	blameworthiness	 to	organisations	due	 to	 failure—whether	 through	 the	concept	of	
negligence	or	corporate	culture—is	potentially	broad	and,	accordingly,	they	have	been	resisted	
by	 the	 corporate	 world	 and	 even	 by	 governments	 that	 might	 be	 held	 accountable	 for	 their	





The	 Royal	 Commission	 has	 provided	 a	 myriad	 of	 examples	 of	 criminal	 negligence	 and/or	






example,	 a	 common	 problem	 in	 institutions	 is	 that	 staff	 have	 not	 been	 trained	 to	 recognise	
grooming	behaviour.	In	Report	No.	12,	the	staff	did	not	realise	they	were	witnessing	grooming	





offending	 teacher	 with	 the	 preparatory	 school	 head.	 She	 felt	 that	 her	 family	 may	 have	 been	












these	 ramifications	 includes	 those	 experienced	 by	WG	who,	 after	 she	 reported	 the	 offending	






















this	 letter	 is	 the	 total	 extent	 of	 what	 has	 occurred,	 I	 believe	 it	 is	 still	 totally	












flags.	For	example,	 in	one	meeting,	he	said	that	 ‘he	had	always	dealt	with	students	 in	a	 tactile	











developed	 clear	 written	 policies	 on	 how	 to	 detect	 child	 abuse	 of	 grooming	 behaviours,	 the	
procedures	 for	 reporting	 child	 abuse	 or	 grooming	 behaviours,	 handling	 complaints,	 expert	
training	 for	 staff	 on	 detecting	 and	 reporting	 child	 abuse	 and	 grooming	 behaviour,	 and	 an	
environment	 which	 is	 conducive	 to	 staff,	 parents	 and	 students	 reporting	 concerns	 (Royal	
Commission	2015b:	10).	This	aspect	of	Report	No.	12	goes	toward	addressing	the	question	of	how	
prosecutors	will	differentiate	between	cultures	and	subcultures.	It	is	apparent	from	Report	No.	








why	 the	 school	 had	 not	 ensured	 that	 appropriate	 procedures	were	 enforced	was	 due	 to	 the	
registration	 process	 undertaken	 by	 independent	 schools	 in	 Western	 Australia.	 Despite	
complaints	 on	 file	 about	 the	 offending	 teacher	 dating	 from	 1999	 onwards,	 the	 school	 was	
approved	for	registration	in	2004	until	2010.	The	registration	report	stated	that	the	school	had	
developed	 and	 implemented	 a	 child	 protection	 policy	 and	 that	 its	 documented	 policies	 and	
procedures	 were	 of	 a	 very	 high	 standard	 (Royal	 Commission	 2015b:	 15).	 The	 registration	



















would	 not	 tolerate	 or	 lead	 to	 the	 commission	 the	 child	 sexual	 assault.	 Standards	 provide	 a	




‘reasonable’	 institution.	 It	 is	 essential	 to	 articulate	 appropriate	 standards	 of	 care	 and	 then	
measure	organisations	against	these	standards.	In	response	to	general	shortcomings	in	state	and	
national	standards,	the	Royal	Commission	has	developed,	articulated	and	clarified	the	national	
principles	 for	 child	 safe	 institutions	 that	 should	 be	 required	 of	 individuals	 and	 organisations	




whilst	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 recognises	 that	 a	 key	 issue	 to	 creating	 child	 safe	 institutions	 is	
‘holding	 institutions	 to	 account	 through	 independent	 oversight	 and	 monitoring’	 (Royal	
Commission	 2016b:	 2),	 at	 the	moment,	 this	 is	 only	 implicit	 in	 the	 ten	 principles	 rather	 than	
expressly	articulated.	Regardless	of	whether	an	institutional	criminal	offence	is	created	based	on	
negligence	or	corporate	culture,	the	terms	of	the	offence	address	fears	of	over‐criminalisation.	In	
order	 to	 be	 successfully	 prosecuted,	 the	 failure	 to	 meet	 ‘reasonable	 standards’	 must	 be	
sufficiently	negligent	to	justify	the	imposition	of	criminal	sanctions.	One‐off	or	isolated	failures	













(Wells	2014).	The	Act	 then	details	 six	principles	 based	on	 the	Organisation	 for	Economic	Co‐





past	 failures	 from	which	 it	had	since	 reformed.	Moreover,	 in	 the	Australian	and	 international	
context,	 increasing	 reliance	 is	 placed	 upon	 ‘deferred	 prosecutions’	 or	 remedies	 such	 as	
‘compliance	 programs’	 or	 ‘enforceable	 undertakings’	 to	 use	 the	 threat	 of	 criminal	 legal	





Systemic	 failure	extends	beyond	the	 types	of	 institutions	 investigated	by	 the	Australian	Royal	
Commission	 to	 legal	 institutions.	 The	 enforcement	 of	 regulatory	 laws	 has	 not	 always	 been	
vigorous	and	 there	have	been	no	prosecutions	of	 any	organisations	 investigated	by	 the	Royal	
Commission.	 This	 reflects	 opposition	 by	 corporations	 generally	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 collective	












expresses	 condemnation:	 it	 is	 not	 about	 just	 wearing	 a	 penalty	 for	 breaking	 the	 law	 but	
opprobrium.	This	expressive	aspect	of	the	law	has	value	(Garland	1990).	Moreover,	it	has	been	








Commission	 Consultation	 Paper	 is	 similarly	 premised	 on	 ‘the	 importance	 of	 seeking	 and	
obtaining	a	criminal	justice	response	to	any	child	sexual	abuse	in	an	institutional	context’	(Royal	
Commission	2016a:	Ch.	2).	The	symbolic,	expressive	power	of	the	law	is	important,	which	is	why	
it	 is	disappointing	 that	 there	was	not	more	 focus	on	 collective	 culpability	 in	 the	Consultation	
Paper.	Reforming	the	criminal	law	in	this	area	proffers	an	opportunity	to	reframe	our	notions	of	
culpability.	It	is	not	an	unfortunate	accident	or	bad	luck	that	offenders	have	been	able	to	offend	









and	 the	 response	 of	 the	 law.	 It	 is	 not	 simply	 a	matter	 of	 a	 legal	 demand	 for	 culpability	 for	 a	
criminal	conviction	that	did	not	adequately	meet	moral	condemnation.	But	the	structure	of	the	

































7	 The	 experience	 of	 staff	 at	 the	 school	 in	 Report	 No.	 12	 (Royal	 Commission	 2015b)	 was	 different	 from	 other	
organisations.	At	that	school	the	staff	communicated	with	each	other	about	their	concerns.	In	contrast,	according	to	
Report	No.	6	(Royal	Commission	2015a),	staff	did	not	communicate	their	concerns	with	each	other	as	much,	and	the	
lack	 of	 systemic	 understanding	 of	 the	 complaints	was	due	 in	 part	 to	 staff	 expressing	 their	 concerns	 to	 different	
members	of	upper	management	who	then	did	not	inform	each	other	(Crofts	2016).		
8	NSW	has	created	 the	offence	of	concealing	a	serious	 indictable	offence	under	s	316	Crimes	Act	1900	 (NSW).	This	
offence	has	been	used	to	prosecute	the	concealment	of	serious	crimes	such	as	murder	and	manslaughter,	but	has	
rarely	been	used	to	prosecute	concealment	of	child	sexual	abuse	offences.	In	2014,	Victoria	has	created	the	offence	







































19	 For	 example,	 both	 Duster	 (1970)	 and	 Manderson	 (1993)	 have	 undertaken	 analysis	 of	 drug	 laws	 in	 different	
jurisdictions	and	have	argued	that	a	change	in	the	legal	status	of	drug	laws	leads	people	to	think	of	an	activity	as	
immoral	even	though	they	had	not	thought	so	previously.	Immoral	connotations	in	relation	to	illicit	drugs	developed	
through	a	process	of	social	stigmatisation	of	drug	users,	by	shifting	from	regulation	by	the	free	market	to	doctors	and	
then	to	police	and	criminal	justice	agencies.	The	intersection	of	law	and	morality	has	also	been	argued	in	relation	to	
the	production	of	sexual	identities.	See,	for	example,	Crofts	(2010);	Stychin	(1995).	
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